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In hiG essay entitled "I'hcnomnnolo(y of Hf~aditlf\" 
Gr~or1'CS lou1ct explains ho'•j a "reetdlnc experience" ls pn~:-
The unlver~e of f1ct1.on is infinitely morc 
eJa~:l:ic th3.n the 't!Orld of objecUvc re.'3.lHy. 
It lenrls itself to any use; it yields wl~h 
llttlP resistance to the iMportunities of 
the mind. ;.:oreover - anc1 of nll +~.hs bene-
fits I find this the most appenll.n~- thjs 
i.ntPrior universe conr~tltut.ed hy lanruave 
doc~: not seem rac~ically opposed to the me 
·:.rhc thit1ks H .•.. In short, stnce everythtr:r 
hn;, b~comc part of my min<:, t.hnnk;~ to +he 
int~C~TV<'ntion of lann.lruc, th0. opposirion 
b~b·r:cn thP suhject ancl its nb,jccts !1ns 
bee'l cGnc~lclr:rably n.ttenu.~1t eel. J\no thus 
the >rcntc~~t advantarc of lit-.~r~1t'H'c 1~ 
l:hDL 1 nm frc"ed from my lJ.sUrJl .~cn.""e of ir;. .. 
(:()!r,p·:d i_biJlty rct:ver~n rny rnn~:(',<)11:'"'nr;;::~, ~c,d 
\ i '" r'l r_, J c 0 t ~· . .1 
1;jhcn J rP8d as 1 C' 1J,<'ht, L e., 1·:i thout 
ments1 reservation, without_ .qr.y r1esirr 
to preserve my independcnc• of ju~rment, 
anrl w1th the ~otal committmrnt required 
of any rcad0r, my comprehnnsJon beromc~ 
.inLuJtjvr; an(~ n.ny fcellnr· prnp(lsed ~;o me 
is immediately assumed by me ••. Headinp, then, 
is the act in which the subjective principle 
'·:hlch I call I is modified ln such a ':rb.y thr>.t 
1 no 1 or~ r, e r h a v c t h c r i ,c: h t , s t r 1 c L 1 y s peA. 1': i n c , 
to consider 1t o.s my I. I o.m on loan to an-
other, and this other thlnks, feels, suffers, 
8.ncl '-tct.s wit.hln me.2 
The phenomenolorical nature of l~ulet's essay is seen in 
hi~ description of th~ reader's trnnsccndcnce of subject-
object and self-other dualisms. Cnly throurh such tran-
The purpose of my paper ls. to shoN hovr thi:: idea 0f 
transcendcnc~ unites two see~inr·ly dissimilar modcP of 
thou;-·ht. - the phenomenolo;-·y of :~r'!muncJ Husserl (1059-19JP) 
::i.nce, for 1-iussc:rl, t:his 1lnderst~tndln,· 1:-; nn Pncl in 1t-.se1f, 
l1c :-tu(:.\cd the net of comprehensinn nnd prr_)chtcecl 8.n ''p;npty" 
ho··F~'JeT. Pnnnc~ must. c::o:rnrm.nlcatr> this i11tuH.ion. Therefon;, 
he concentrated upon th8 ~ct of expression and h\s 1deas 
exist ln thR form of crjtical oh~ervations and po~~~. Jt 
ITl1.H~t be stated that there J.s no evldence to sho<·: that eith-
cr mp,n hacl ever heard of the other. Thcnofore, nlJ concl11-
;:;ions rer:J.rd inr ·their s'lmi.lar:i ties arlse frorn my intE.!rprc-
tations of ~ammon menninps and intentions~ 
Specifically, I will begin my comparisons with a look 
at their attitudes to~ard tradition and the individual's 
role in lt. next, I '''ill introduce Husr-~erl's v·ork, from 
vhich I •:•ill ext:r-act a term:l.nolor·y to be applind to Poun(l. 
For example, !Ius~~ erl • s reduct ion (the aforenent ioncd "set-
tinr aside" of non-essent:ials) is reflectPd i:n 1-ound's O':.'n 
el:irnination of irrelevant cornnentary and ~xccsslve descrlp-
t 1 r)n. r·1mi1A.rly, :1u~~scrl's uni.que unc1erc:tnndlnr of lcwic 
brinps to mind Found's enthusiasm for ~rncst Fcnollosa'c 
theory of larwuaPe. I r::lll extend this c.ompari:::;(lYJ until 1 
to explain the method of poetry. 
Path men sou;-ht to cstahlir~h the fmmc~1.U.on:-: of t 1Jr~.lr 
1n a Pim1lar manner. That is, both equated t.rn~ltion with 
thP constant rcne,··al of insipht. in '.·•hich t!Je ir.cJl'.Jicual ar·-
.rlvcs at ench ce.rtA.1nt:y for himself and in his o~:,·n mr-.mner. 
Husserl ·,·;rit.cro: "i'[lsdorr. ••• is the phiJosoph~r·~: quite per-
sona1 affair. It must arise as hl.s 1dsdoru, as hir: self-
acquired know1Pdre tending toward universality, a kno~lcdFe 
for ~"'h 1c h he c nn o.r.s'·J (~r from the ber inni nr: and '"• 1 enc h .step, 
by virtue of his ovm absolute inslehts .••. " In these terms 
he clefines his view of philosophical tradition: "In recent 
times the longin~ fbr a truly alive philosophy has led to 
many a renaissance. Must not the only fruitful renaissance 
be the one that rea\,rakens the implJlse of the Cartesian Jvied-
itatirms: not to adopt their content but, in not doinr.:- so, 
to renew ~lth greater intensity the radicalness of their 
spirit, the radicalness of self-responsibility, to make that 
radicalness true for the first time by enhancinp it to the 
last derree ... ?"J 
For his part, Pound writes: "Hy pawing over the an-
clents and semi-ancients has been one strurgle to find out 
what has been done, once and for all, better than it can 
ever be done arain. and to find out what remains for us to 
do, and plenty does remain, for if we still feel the same 
emotions as those which launched the thousand ships, 1~· is 
" quite certain that Ke come on these feelinrs differently. 
throuph different nuances, by different intellectuaJ ~rad-
atlons. ~o rood poetry is written in a manner twenty years 
old, for to write in such a manner shows conclusively that 
~ 
the writer thinks from books, convention, and cliche, and 
not from 1 i fc ...• .. L~ Found developed a critical procedure 
V'hic.h he called "Excernment." This term, first used in The 
~pirit of !1omance, refers to "the r.eneral orderlll,f' anci vreed-
inf out of what has already bee~ performed. The elimination 
of repetitions. ~he work analorcus to that which a good 
han~ing committee or curator would perform in a ~ational 
Gallery or blolo[~icr:tl museuP'l.." He draNs a clear d 1st lnc-
tlon beb;een d 1lutf~rs and inventors. Lilutcrs are "symp-
tomatic" authors who made no real contribution to the art 
("the men vJho d ld more or less p:ood work in the more or 
1 ess fOOd style of a period") , .but inventors are those 
"donn.tive" authors who seemed to "dravJ down into the art 
somethlnp 1·rhlch Nas not in the art of [their] predecessor~~." 
For Husf>erl. ·then, tradition means a certain fresh-
ness of comprehension; for Found it is a freshness of ex-
pression. Both, ho~ever, focus upon the same penernl ob-
ject. Pound 1·:rites: " ... the essential thinF is thA.t the 
poet build us his ,,;orld "Sand Husr~erl states that "the 
world [that phenomenolory is to study] i.s not the object-
ive world of nature but the 'envlronlng ::rorld' (Ur.r,relt) ·of 
the spiritual subject ... 6 1'he idea of an "envlronin,;:r 1·:orlq" 
brings to nind Pound's phantastikon, the poetic (image-
mnkinc) faculty involved ln such world-buildinv. Pound 
r:xplains: ~he] consciouRness of some seems to rest .•. in 
1·:hnt the Gree1t p~yc holo~ist s called the phantA.st H~on. 'Their 
minds are, that is, circumvolved about them like soap-
bubbles reflectinp sundry patches of the macrocosmos."? In 
an original (1917) version of Canto I he uses the term to 
describe h1s o~n difficulties: 
And shall I claim, 
Confuse my own phantastikon 
Or say the filmy shell that circumscribes me 
r;ontalns the actual sun; 
confuse the thin~ I see 
Fith o.etual cods behind me? 
· Are they ~::ods behind me? 
How many worlds we have!8 
Ar:; a poet Found must distincuish bet'::een those levels 
of expression 't:hich are derived from ''book[>, convent ion, 
and cliche" and those which refer directly to the environ-
inp world of the artist and, therefore, define his parti~u-
/ lar virtu. In an essay entitled "On Virtue" he explains 
the term: 
The soul of each man is compounded of all 
the elements of the cosmos of souls, but in 
each one there is some one clement which pre-
dominates, which is in some way the quality 
or virtG of the indivlduaJ.; in no two s6uls 
is this the same. It is by reason of' this 
virtG that we have one Catullus, one Villon; 
by reason of it that no amount of technical 
clevernef~S can produce a ~·,ork having the 
charr1 of the original. •. 9 
Virtu is the essence of the artist in the expression. It 
is the artist as a mode of presentation. 
~ince the unc1erstandlnp: of essenc:c n.s a mode of prE'-
scntat 1on l.s n fundamental feature of Hu sser11an phenomen:.. 
olory, a full introduction to the procedure whereby qusserl 
arrlves at his own intuitions is appropriate. Fhcnomenolo~y 
is R philo~ophlcal method which ~onsists of dcscrlhing phen-
orneno. - the objeets of experience ,.;h1eh are irn.rwdlately p:lv-
en to consciousness. To do this one must first ene-a1•e in a 
'7 ( 
process of phcnomenoloplcal reduction in ~hlch all super-
ficial, irrelevant, or ascribed values of both the subject 
and :its ob,j~~ct <~re "bracketed," or set aside. For th:\.s 
renson phenomenology may be set apart from the prevailin~ 
empirical and Kantian thoupht of the time. Husserl writeE: 
"A theory of copnition that is to study the relation be-
tvreen beinf' and consciousness must cone ern 1 t self Nith 
that beinr which corresponds to consciousness (ideal beinr) 
rather than with a consciousness that would correspond with 
existential being."lO Phenomenology 1::- not an inve~tlr:ation 
of internal or externnl facts. Any ideas re~ardlng the 
"existcntla1" reality, "partiGularity," etc. of an object 
are necessnrily products of the intellect and, therefore, 
ir-relev~:mt to phenonenological concerns. 'Ihir: i;. especially 
tru-: of the Kantian "thing-in-J.tself." The proper object of 
phenomeno1oclc81 attention is essence - the "idep.l intelli-
,c-ible content" of the object - sei7.ed immediately in an act 
of intuition. Husserl states: 
7he physical identity of an object is intel-
licible only through the acts in ~hich the ob-
ject is present to consciousness, since it is 
precisely the relation to consciousness (in 
these acts) that makes it an object. Essences, 
then, that be1ong to the ideal sphere can be 
grasped as immediately in intuition as physJ.-
cal reality is in perception.- and only thus 
can they be [<rasped at R11. Thus phenomena-
lory is a study of es~ences only, whereby it 
er:capes the objections aralnst introspection, 
which ls an observation of fnctual psycholo~i­
cal processes and not ideal objcctlvlties.ll 
Husserl feels that a psycholor;len.l theory of e~:-:ence '·•rould 
be relative, subjectivist and, therefore, unable to estab-
lish an absolut.e foundation of krowledce. 
Jn orrlcr to delineate phenomenology's specific con-
cerns, Hus~erl developed the. idea of intentionalit~. {He 
is indebted to his teacher, Franz 3rentano, for the term 
nnd the basic concept). Briefly, it means this: All con-
r:~clousness is consc tousness of something. A.s I .H. Bochenskl 
explains it : "It is the essential quality of certr1in ex-
periences to be experiences of an object: these experiences 
are intentionally related to the object ...• ~onsc1ousness is 
seen as a pure reference point for intentionality to which 
the intentional object is presented and one sees the object 
2.s intentionally F;}ven to the sub,jcc·t. "12 l·1auricc 1 atan~on 
C'~.rries it further: "Perception is not a state h1Jt a mo-
bUr activity. In H s ess ent 1 al dynR.mic, perception (1·:hlch 
~1'':' are tnkinr- in the '.ddest possible Penr~e) projects itself 
tcmnrdh 1ts 1ntended object, but that object ls not to oe· 
undcn:tood u.f: a 'thi.n,r' but rather a~ the eorrelate of 1ts 
o.ecomp::n1yinr~ oct or acts .... ;,•hat re~'la1ns is the object as 
meant, re,ro.rdcct pureJy in terms of its rlvenness to the pre-
cisc extent that it is given and solely in the manner in 
vhlch it ls r:iven."l) 
Husse~l introduC"es the ~ords noesis and noema to stand 
for the int.encling net and the intentional object. As stated 
earlier, there is a process of reduction for each. But, 
as Eatanson states, "noesis must be understood in its act-
lve relationship·to noema. The separation between them is 
lepitim0te, necessary, yet artificial ~ a matter 0f dis-
tinpuishlnp rather than separatln~. roesis and noema imply 
and d ernond eGc h other. ulL} Thl s understand j ng affi:rms ph en-
omenology's status as a theory of meaning rather than one 
of belne-. It also underscores the character of the "object 
as r::tcn.nt" - that ls, the object ar> n.n immediate mode of pre-
::;entation to consciousness. Essence is seen in its inten-
tional fullness. 
One important obstacle to the realization of essence 
ls our orclinary sense of time. r:·ime as l·Je ltnoN H in our 
natural attit-ude is termed "cosmlc ttme" - the t1me of sci-
ence ann public reference. 1:!e arc a'Nare of lt as an int el-
lectual product. "Fhenomenolor;.ical time," hoNever, refers· 
strictly to 1ndlvidual experience o.s t:Jven. HusFcrl 1·.Tlte:::-: 
Throuc;h the phenomenolor:lcal reduction con-
Gciouriness has forfeited not only its appercep-
tive "ntt;ochr.lent" (in t:ruth only an 1Jnar:e) to 
material reality and its relations in space, 
merely secondary thouc;h these be, but also its 
settinG ir' comnica] time. rr·he Game tiPJe, 1•:h1ch 
belonrs essentially to experience as such ~lth 
the modes in ~hich its intrinsic content in 
pr~sented - and derived from these the modally 
determined now, before and nfter, s.imultaneity, 
succension and so forth - is not to be measured 
hy nny state of the sun, by nny clock,. by any 
physical means, and renerally cannot be mens-
, ~ ll lS urea a,_ a.. . ..-
The imrnedi9te phenornenolorical time sense does not depend 
upon a concept of causality to sustain jt. Apain Husscrl 
expLd n:::: 
The essr,ntial property "~hich· the term· "temp-
orality" expresses in relation to experiences 
~enerally indicates not only something ~hich 
belon~s in a reneral way to every single ex-
perience, but a necessary form binding exper-
iences ~ith experiences. Every real experi-
ence (we ratify this as self-evident on the 
flrOund of the clear intuition of an experi-
ential reality) is necessarily one that en-
dures; and with this duration it takes its 
place ~ithin an endlesG continuum of dura-
tions - a concretely filled continuum. It 
necessarily has a temporal purview concretely 
filled, and stretching away on all sides. 
And that at once tells us that it belongs to 
one endless "stream of experience.'' Every 
sinrle experience can be~ln and end and 
there'::lth brinp: its duration to an end ••. But 
the r~ream of experience cannot begin and 
end. 
;:y ellmin2.tinr·~ "bep.inninr:s" and "endinP·s" ·:·e a:re nble to 
'1.0 
estahllGh n ~till point in which the structural re:rta1ntles 
of cxperlcnre nay.be seen. Patan2on ~rites: 
',•:ith C:'J.usation brac1~eted [L e., set as1<3rJ in 
the reduced sphere, the phenomenoloclcnl notion 
of orifln is free of sequential orderin[. In-
stead, attention is turned to the flow of in-
tentionnlity as consciousness reveals itself 
in a multitude of perceptions, judpments, re-
nembc·rinn.;, and antic ipat infs. ':'o p:et at the 
oricir•s of such a flovJ is to elucidate the 
mesh of 8.cts o.nd syntheses 1·1hich const lt.ute 
the experiential world.17 
r.xperience is thus reparded in "its mode of decl8rlnr:: itsc1f: 
... the m0dus of the actunl 'N01·r'" ,<md, n.~; Eusserl states, the 
"actu,ql no~· is necessarily someth1nr: punctunl and remains so, 
a form that persists throu,d1 continuous chance of content. .. lB 
ll 
Husscrl' r: "actual nov-:" provides the structurP of the 
experience of time. Pound, too, focuses upon time's mode 
of prcsentatlor 1n order to realize a critical siandard for 
literature. He ~rites: 
All ares are contemporaneous. It is B.C., 
let us say, in Morotco. Th~ Middle Apes 
are in Hussia. The future stirs already 
in the minds of the fev. This is especial-
ly true of literature, where the real time 
ls independent of the apparent, and rhere 
many dead men are our grandchildren's con-
temporaries, while many of our contempora-
ries have been already ~athcred into Abra- 10 ham's bosom or some nore fittinp receptacle. ; 
It may be stated that; 1'rhereas Husr.;erJ' s "no'''" j s found 
strictly "within time", Founc~'s stntcments refer to the 
"nov-'" of the "everpresent," "~>rhlch is "outs:l.oe" of tlmc. 
It ir~ my opinion, ho•··ever, that the importAnce of both ls 
due to th~:ir ''rootedness". in the experlent.tal 'i'Orld. Pound' F 
vleF of time recalls Husserl ''i "temporal l)1Jrvic1·· concretely 
the past in chronolo~lcal sequence. 1t may be convenient 
to lay it out 8naesthetlzed on the table ~ith dates pas~~d 
on here and there, but what he 1mm·; r·e knoN by :ripples and 
spir~1ls cc1dy:l.nr· out from us an<; from our or··n time ... 20 
A more :::;pecific reference to "vhat 1H'~ knoN" :::md 1n 
d1at forra ~H~ kno··.~ it l~; found in an essay by Pound ent 1 t led 
"Axlomata"(l921). At the end of o. short sec.tlon on "the 
intimate er;[=nnce of ~~he universe;' ano the limjtF: of con-
sciou;:;ness, he states, v:lth chgracteristic certainty, "God. 
therefore. exists." He gives as his reason the idea that, 
given man's inability to know for sure, there i~ no reason 
not to ronY so. de prefers, however, to ca11 this divine 
presence Theos and makes it clear that we have no way of 
knmdng Yhether this 'rheos "is one, or is nany, or is div-
isible or indivisible, or is an ordered hierarchy culminat-
inc, or not culminating, in a unity .•.• " floreover, the 
Theos rnny or may not affect the consciousness which, in 
turn, may or may not know why, or even if, it has been af-
fected. For this reason Pound, too, restricts his attention 
to the immediately given: 
If the consciousness receives or ha~ re-
ceived such effects from the theos (sic), 
or from something which consciousness has 
been incapable of understanding or classi-
fying as either theos or a-theos, it is in-
capable bf reducine these sensations to co-
herent sequence of cause and effect. 'l'hc 
effcct.s remain, so far as the consciousness 
is concerned, in the domain of experience, 
not differing intellectually from the taste 
of a lemon or the fra&ranc0 or violets or 
the aroma of dunrhilln, or the feel of a 
stone or of tr~e-bark. or any other direct 
perception .... · 1 
?ound's statoaents are not to be ta~:en as an empjrical or 
psycholop-ical thc()J'Y nny more thon Husscrl'::; refc:ren~ e to 
experlenct: as "a concrete1y fl.lled continuum." As Geon~~e 
r ekke:r states.. ''To the Found inn vi Ci:.J of real 1 ty, I es-c n.rt es • 
(or any Sceptic's) introspective method of positins the uni-
ver~e on the basis of his o~n mental activity is sacrileg-
ious as \·;el1 as perverse. •·2 2 S tmilarly, Huss crJ.' s \·rill in€"-
lJ 
ne~s· to accept the spirit, but not the content, of Tesr.artes' 
Meditation~ is a way of expressing agreement Kith the Cartes-
ian method of seekin~ out and establishinv that which is a 
certainty, but lamentinp:: the fact that resc8.rtes could not. 
deveJ.op his ovn idea beyond a certain psychological point. 
J:ekker ·sees Pound's vier,r as a form of "the. medieval. 
'foctrine of Si~natures,' which holds that all created 
thinBs contain the 'sivnatures• of divine forms and, as ~uch. 
should be respected." He also recognizes the Platonic qual-
ity of Four:cJ's thought,.but points out that "in 1tr: rn·rnnre-
ment of values lt differs radically from Platonism proper 
and from many forms of ~eopJ.atoni~m (Christian or pagan) 
which stress the inferiority of 'created things' and the de-
sirr::J.bll i ty ~f turning aNay from then to,,.;ard the Prime J.!nver. 
For Found it l~ al•·'A.YS this v;orld that matter~ .... "2 3 In 
other 1··or<l s, for Found (a~ for Eusserl), it is only by vi e1•r-
ins th0 ~iven object as a mode of presentation that one may 
u rd e:rsi, n.nc1 the 11ni versal nature of nxperi f::ne e. 
: lnsely related to this idea iB that r..:-tatcd by Latanson: 
"rhenonenolocJ.cal reduct ion is cone crned 1··i th the i nt ersu b-
jectlve ir2pulr.e hidden in the apparent privacy of perception. " 21~ 
That i~. an ind1vidua1 act is ~een as a variation of some 
u~iversal intentionnl structure. As such, it may be ~re-
ducec~" to that structure and conmuntcatecl. '~·his is the 
orlr in of llyth .. As renis de Pou1~.emont states: ",c;peaking 
cenerally, a myth is a story - a symbolical fable as simple 
as it is striking - which sums up an infinite number of 
more or les~ analogous situations. A myth makes it possible 
to become m;a:re at a r-lanc e of c ertaln types of constant re-
lations and to disen~age these from the welter of everyday 
appearances. "2 .5 This reference to myth as a rmmmation of 
"an infint e number'' of analogous situations introduces the 
idea of "expression as equation," an idea c··hich Founc~ :dl1 
pursue and develop. Ile ::;tat es: 
The first myths 8rose vhen a man walked 
sh~er into 'nonsense:• that ls to say, when 
some very vivid and undeniable adventure be-
fell him; and he told someone else who called 
him R liar. Thereupon, after bitter experi-
ence, perceivine that no one could understand 
~hat_he meant vhen he said he 'turnerl into a 
tree' he made a myth - a ~ork of art that is -
an impersonal or objective story woven out of 
his own emotion, as the nearest equat;i,gn t;hat: 
ne Ym; cap8.ble of putting into ,.·ords . .-:-:) 
Found'sallusions to nathema.tics ("equationr;" for human 
moods, poe~_:r;y a[; "inspired mathemntlcs") arc ···ell lmo~·rn, but 
E'..tr;~erl also consldeTs his goal to be the 1oc3tion "::lthin 
experience of "the l{ind of nec.essit.Y '··hich mather.-~atics has, 
but a nceesr:ity 1·:hich is a function of our llfe in t:he 1··orld 
rather than the postulations and definitions of an axiomatic 
11ethod. "27 In order to achieve this he mur:-t rc-examlne the 
nature of ]ogle itself. 
In 1900-1901 Husserl v;rote his first sicniflcant 1·rork, 
Lo~ical InvestiRations. As the title suggests, it was an 
oriGinal study of the foundations of logic and contained a 
devastatinF criticism of the nominalist position vhich had. 
dominated the nineteenth century. Stated simply, nomlnali~m 
is th8.t clo~trine l'hich holds that only particular things are 
real. Universals are no more than names with which we form-
ulo.t c f cneral id ens. 'l'he nominal1. st ~··auld remark thn.t, a,l-
thou~h science is about things, locic is not. The task of 
logic is this reneral formulation an~. therefore, has no 
foundation of its o~n. It is only the applicationofa method 
anri, as such, is dependent upon other sources for it~ valid-
ity. 
Hus:--erl upsets this vle1'! by sho\·:in& that, lf ~~uch ideas 
···ere true, logic 17 0Uld be nothinr more thr-m a system of in-
(JtJ.ctive r--enern.l:izntior1s - in short, mere rules. But, citinr 
3rentnno's "All consciousness is consciou0ness of somethine;r." 
he reveals that, in fe.ct, logical "1a,_·,r:.·" do not refer +:o 
"1·:hat should be" but to .. ,,·hat is." F'or 8XfJ111ple, the logieal 
L'l.~·T of coni:T.'ldiction does not state that "t:·.:o c.ontradictor,y 
stc-ttementr: are not e:xpresslble" or thnt one must only sur-
mise thnt one of t~o contradictory statements is true and 
the other one false. fimilarly, when t~o propositionG of· 
the forn ''A11 A's are .3's'' and "All i:'s are ~;'s" are true, 
it is not to be only surMised that a corresponding proposi-
1./) 
tion of the form ''All A's are C's" is true. E.3uch an 9.tt.i-
tude lnYolves the idea of the "possibility that such a sur-
mise 1··ould fail to be confirrned by an extension of our ever-
limited horizon of experience." This notion that a valid 
syllogism '·rith true premises may be false runs counter to 
the very nature of logic ttself. IlusE"erl' s reev0luation of 
H s nature shoNs ·that the lavs of logic have nothing at all 
to do 1·'ith thought and ,judgment; they are specified by so!n~-. 
thint:: objective. '!'heir object is not the judgment, but the 
content of this judcmcnt. Bochenski states: 
Yhenev~r we understand a name or a statement, 
the sirnificance of neither one nor the other 
of these expressions can be treated as though 
it vere in any Yay a part of the correspondinf 
act of understandln~; it is, much more truly, 
its meaning. ~hat is me8nt by such expres~ion" 
in relation to the manifold of individual ex-
perience is q~ !~entity in the stronfest sense 
of the tern.'--( 
Even lhe idea of a universal has nothing to do with a fener-
nli~ed imape. For example, it does not matter ~·hat one imag-
j ne0 '··hen mie thinks of R mathematical propos it ion bcc~llJGe 
the univ8rsal ls an ideal intelligible content. It is not 
snbject to p;.;yeho1ogical or aecidcntal influences. It is 
an immediately ~iven structural certninty. 
Husserl, then, foundE the nature (and, therefore, the 
J.anp-uoge) of loe·ic upon its object, the '·:orld as intended. 
Pound, too, derives a loglc of lanruare from the same found-
1'1 
ation. ;:.rne::;t Fenollosn's es~ay ''The ::hlnese ',.\'ritten Char-
acter as a Ledium for Poetry" may b€:~ tal(en as a p:rimer for 
understandinr- Pound's thour:ht on this theme. Accordinp: to 
Fenollosa, ~estern thought is dominated by a medieval fu1ro-
perm loe;ic - the "lor;lc of class if 1.cat ion'' - i·rhich derives 
from n n~aJ{ened lanc:;uage, that is a lanf_"Uaf'"e based upon the 
universal copula "is" (or, as the case T:lD.y be, "ls not"). 
By :i.ts very nnture, such a lanQ.l.<Jge is unable to deal v:ith 
any kind of interaction or multiplicity of function. "Ac-
cording to it," he states, "the functlon of my muscles is 
as isolated from the function of my nerves ~s from an earth-
20 . 
qu:1.J-;-e in the moon." / 'l'hls form of expre:::Fion, t.hen, c1oes 
not accu:r-ately reflect the nature of its ob,ject. 
In opposition to this system Fenollosa presents the 
Chiner:e ,-rittcn character ar-> an expresGion of an authentic 
and, E1ore to the point, fundamentally tTans it i ye form. He. 
states: "'l'hP. true formula for thou~:-::ht .is: 'l'he cherry tr.ee 
is all that it docs. Its corrcln.t ed verb::: C0T'lpor;e it." )O A 
true noun, he says, does not exist ln natur~. A thlnr i~ 
only a meet inc point of aet ions, ct coherenc c of functions. 
But o. pure verb, n.n abstract mot.ion, 1s equally impof'.:-::ible. 
"'ih~,~ eye sr.cs noun and verb as one: thinr:s in rnoti()n, motion 
in thln~s ..... Jl 
Lan~uorc, 3ccordinE to Fcnollosa, derives its fundq-
l.P. 
ment8.l r;trueture from that of nature. Jnr-tead of the l··ea}{ 
copula, the transitive verbs are the proper bases of laricuage. 
They nopt accurately reflect the dynamic nature of reality. 
For example, the static form "The tree is £'Teen" would be 
rendered in the Chinese style ar; '"I'he tree r:reens (itself)." 
F'urtherrno1·e, the sent. enc e form is seen n.s a refl cct ion of 
the temporal order in causntlon: "All truth has to be ex-
prer- r~ ed 1 n sent cnc es because all truth is the transf erenc,c 
of po•·;cr." 'This transference of po:·;er ("Farmer pou:.;ch~ rice") 
is the distribution of force bet'l·'een thinc·s ("thine·s in mo·-
tion, mot1on in things") •. Indeed, the things are thereby 
defined. 'hey exist as .synthetlc unit.Jer. of force. 'Pore-
flect this synthetic unity, the Chinese r·:ritten character 
consir-tc of a juxtnpo:::ition of tNo or more concrete .units. 
'l'he •·mcanir1['' of D character ir; construed from the pattern 
of. these unlts (mnn + flre ::: messmate). FcnollosD tracer-; 
even abctr~ct terms back to their roots imbedded in concr~te 
interaction (L e., "ll'hc sun sie:t1 to.ngled in the brAnches 0f 
the tree ~:iF:"n ~ ca.st, ""'l'he sun underlyine.; the bur~tinr: forth 
f> 1 t j ") c.:re ctater "'l.'l1r~ f'_ .• ·re~ter r·)rt·. of nat-01 po.n:s::::: :::pr.nr:. 1.-.• , • "'" -, ,, - . 
ural truth is hidden in processes too mlnute foJ" vision and 
in h9.rrnon1es too lnr,se, in vibrn.t ions, cohec ion.co n.nd aff lnl-
tiP.s." ThP.sc hidden unc!erstandin[!ro must also be cxprcsc:cd 
1 marc;· to m.tct. est imnat cr ial rclat.lonr:." ?enollo:oa hold::~ that 
nwh a usc is vo.lld because cf tts orir;in: "'i.'he vh0le deli-
c o.t e substnnc e of r:peech is built upon substrato. of metaphor •.. 
E\Jt the prlmitiye metaphors do not spYing from nrbitrary sub-
jr:ctivc procesr.:c.s. '!'hey are possible only because they fo1-
lrw objective lines of relation :in nature hcrself."J? 
He have ~een that the obje~t. existing in 2n intentional 
rel8.t ions hip vri th the subject, is :int ell~ gi ble only thyough 
thP acts in ~hich it becomes present to consciousnesr. 0n 
the other hand, Husserl' s j d cas on lor:lc a·ncl Fenollo.sa' :"' 
lanr.;uae:e theory (Khich round accepted ::md used to justify 
his poetic constructions) pround these acts upon the nature 
of the object itself. There is, then, an essential ccrre~-
pone) cnc e bet'· een the act of c omprehen2 ion (or express ion) 
onri the object comprehended (or expres~ed) • 
••• ~he cxpressinF stratum, from the side of 
:its thctic charEJctPr, is coP1pletely one in 
es~ence ~ith that ~hich finds expres~ion, 
nnd ·ln the covering proccs~ .absorbs its e~­
sence so completely that ~e CPlJ the exp~8~­
sive prcsentinr just pre~cntinE;· .. ~·he ex-
prcsPinr stratum c~nnot have a thesis. po-
sit:Lonrd 0r neutral, thR.t is othendse qual-
ified than the stratum that suffers expres-
sion, and ,.hen the t1,ro cover e.qch other' c 
fin<1 not. h·ro thej~f' to be kc:~pt sepurate, "'nut 
one the~1s only. 
T·his pasS?fC doe~~ more than state the ef:sentin1 ccrrr::spond-
ence hct~c~n expresPion and expressed; it also describes a 
qunl:ity cf' r:rPat poetry. T.S. Eliot, in hls :).Yltroduction 
Feople nay tll1n1c they like the form because 
they like the content' or think they li.ke the 
content bec~use they like the forM. In the 
perfect poet they fit and are the same thin~r 
and in another sense they always are the same 
thinr. -8o it is always true to say that form 
ar:d ,c~nt;~t~ ~.re the. sa~e t~i~g, ~nd nh:a.y: Jli-
true to .~d.J- Lhat they .... re c,Lferent thine>"· 
In order to mairitain this correspondence (in either 
liusserliun or Poundi.an terms) ~-·e murot pay strict att:enUon 
to the proble~s of expression itself. In 1912 Pound writes~ 
An art is vital only so lon~ as it is inter-
pretative, so lon~ that is, as lt manifests 
somethinc t·•hlch the art 1st perceives at rreat-
er intensity, and more intimately, than his 
public •..• The interpretative function is the 
highest honor of the arts, and because it is 
so we find that a sort of hyper-scientific 
~re?l~~on i~ the touc~stone and ~ssay ~f_the_ JS 
c1.rt1st s po,·er, of hL- honor, hi., o.uthentic~ty. 
Husserl, too, ackno'.·.•lede;es the "evidence of the expres-
t:ion" 88 "a determinine; part of the idea of scientific truth." 
In fr'.ct, he includes it in the forr:mJ.ntion of his f1.r::::t neth-
orloloctcnl principle: 
.•• Because the sciences aim nt predications 
thn.t express completely and 1·rith evident f1t-
nes~3 vhn.t is beheld pre-predlcatively, it is 
obvious that I must be careful also about this 
aspect of scientific evidence. C~inc to the 
instabjJ.ity and nrnbit::uity of ('OT.'lmon lanr:uare 
and its much too e:reat compJacency about com-
pleteness of expression, we require, even 
~here we use its means of expression, a nc~ 
leFitimation of si~nifications by orienting 
them to accrued insip·hts, and fix1nr of ·:·orcls 
as expressinF the si~nifications th~s le~iti­
matcd. ~hat too ~e a~count as pnrt of our 
norr.Jative prlnclple of evldcn('e, v~hicgtve 
shall apply consistently from now on. ) 
Pound~s critical ~ofks (excluding those which veer in-
to the social sciences) deal primarily ~ith the legitimation 
of the expression. In an early espay he ~··rites: '"I'he art-
ist's jnheritance from other artists can be little more 
tlvm ccrtn.J.n enthusiasms, tvhich usually spoil his first vork; 
and a definite knovledr:;e of the modes of expression, which 
kno•··lcdce contributes to perfeet inr· his rnore matn.re perform-
G.nce. •:'hi::> .i.s a Jratter of technique ... 37 In "A T:Ptrospect" 
(191E) he includes technique in his Credo: "I belteve in 
techn1que as the test of a man's sincerity, in lm: '·hen it 
is ascertainable; in the tramplinr down of every convention 
that impedes or obscures the determination of the lav, or 
J'l the precise renderinr.; of the impulse." c 
Found's vim·! of technique as an o.ctive encounter ···ith 
experience reflects Hu~serl'r; underst.and1ne· of lntention8.1-
ity. Found yrites: "There are t~··o opposed 1w.ys of thinklrw 
of n. m."J.n: fl rstly you mqy thlnk of hlr.1 :?.s th:=tt to;·rard ···hich 
perception moves, as the toy of ~ircumstance •. qs the plastic 
rubRtance receivinG impressions; secondly you nay thtnk of 
him· n.s clirectjr)g a certnJn fluid force ap-a:ln.st c1rcumstarwe, 
8G conceivinr instead 6f merely reflecting and 'lQ obs erv ln,n·. ""', 
Eu::;:-:;erl, too, .understands t~·o nodes of experience, 
'.··htch he calls active and pa . .ssive gcmesis: 
In active cenesls the E.-o functions as pro-
ductively constitutive, by means of subject-
ive processes that are specifically acts of 
the Eco .... The characteristic feature ..• is 
that Euo-acts~ •. become combined in a mani-
fold, specifically active synthesis and, on 
the basi~ of objects already given (in modes 
of consciousness that give beforehand), cons-
titute nev.r objects originally •.• [But] any-
thinr ~lilt by activity necessarily presup-
poses, as the lowest level, a passivity that 
rives somethinp: beforehand; and, '•hen \•.:e 
trace R.nythinp: built actively, 1/~e r1t8 into 
constitution by passive feneration. 
Active c.cnesis, accorcline; to Husserl, is the source of ·sll 
"spi.ritual" or "cultural" characteristics ·of an object or 
experience, all meaning. 
Pound, of course, prefers the active conception of 
poetry over the pas~ive reception of an impression. In 
J-oet-rl Lev lev: (linrch, 191?) he l•Jri tes: " .•• no impression, 
hcwever ca.refully art lculatecJ, can, record eel, convey th!Jt 
feeling of sudden light ~hich the ~orks of art should and 
mu;.;t eonvey ... hl In this manner Pound d ist inrruishes betr··ei;n 
IMpressionism and Vorticism. Impressionism, he r:ays, "t:our<'ht 
j_ts theoretic defense in, if it did not arise from, Berkeley's 
theory of the minimum v:lsiblc, .i.e., of the points of llp:ht 
aYJcJ r.olour on tile retina." r;'he Impressionir:t (1 fTlves his 
plensure "f:rol!l the stro~{jY!f: and pushinc: of the ret tnn by 
of 
L~2 .. 
vg.r_iou 8 colours." 'f'he Vort lc ist, on the 
other h~nd, takes a more active ;.;tancc. Pound writes: 
"Forma to the rrer-tt minds of at least one rrre:1t epoch meant 
more than dead pattern or fixed opinion. 'i:'he llp:ht of the 
IOEJ:-1, as it 1·: ere a form clcav inr; to 1 t meant an ACTIV1~ pat-
tern, a patter}) that ;,cts thinr's ln lnotlon ... hJ 
In or~er to transcend dead pattern and fixed opinion, 
the poet ;nust en,sare in the literary equivalent of phenom~ 
enolop:ical Teductlon. 'l'hat is, he must strip a'.·'ay the non-
essential aspects of the expression. As stated earlier, 
there is a coTrespondinc· reduction for the int~ndinr act 
(the subject) and its intended object. Husserl uses the 
term "phenomenolop::ical reduction" in reference to the forner 
8.nd "eidetlc" (essential) reduction for the latter. Fhen-
ornenolo~ical reduction of the subject, expressed another 
~ay, ls the process ~hereby the transcendental ~tate of 
restralnt or suspension on the pn.rt of the philosopher ,., ith 
rec:ard to hls particlpation or conplieity in experience. ,.l~4 
liu;;~'erl is quic1r to point out that nothine; is "lost" to 
consciousness durin[; thi2 state of restraint. en the con-
trary, ~nochc 1s a d12vice ,·:hereby co;-1plet.c objectivity· is 
Rchievecl. He explains: 
(In everyday life] ..• T.·e assert: 'I see a 
house there' or 'I remember havinc heard 
this melody.' In transcendental-phenomen-
ological reflection ve deliver ourselve2 
fron this footing, by universal epoche 
with respect to the bcin~ nnd non-beinr 
of the 1·:orlc1. r;·he experience as thus 
mocllfied, the transcenc]ental experience. 
consists, then, ~e can cay, in our look-
in~ at and describing the particular trans-
Ct=5~1dentally redueed ~orito, but l··ithout 
participatinE, as reflective subjects, ln 
the natural existence-positing that the 
original straight-forvard perception (or 
other coglto) contains or that the Eeo, 
as imrne~sing himself stralrhtfo~vardly in 
the ~··orld, actually executed ••• :.1.5 
llusscrl describes this detachJneht as a "splittinG of the· 
L:co" into a transcend ental "dis int crest cd onlooker" R.bovc 
the ''i18,tvely interested 1~~r:·o.~' 
Pound's o~n poetic ~ethod involves a similar form of 
impersonal tty. It is vhat i·1R.llarme culled "the elocution-
ary disappearance of the poet, ~·.·ho ylelds place to the 
words." Pound l·;rites: "In the 'search for oneself,' in 
the search for 'sincere self-expression,' one rropes, one 
fiPds :orne seeminG verity. Une says, 'I am' this, th•1.t, or 
the other, and Kith the words scarcely uttered one ceases 
to be that thing. I be~an this search for the real in a. 
boo1\: ca1led Personae, castine off, a;, j_t r:ere, complete 
lp' 
masks of the self in c:aeh poen." ) Found is takJne: note of 
the f~1rt that, as one :-rite.s "I am" in a poem. 'l . .splittine: 
of the l•;ro oceurs bet1·een the Er o as expressed ·(the object-
ive e,rr,o) and the transcendental (subjr~c.t.ivc) e1_~o. 
Althour_::h l'ound states that he b~ean his "search for 
the real" ·:·1 th Personae, an even r:>arl i cr Ps~·ay reveals i:ho. t 
he ~·rEJ.s n~··2re of the ,::eneral procedure. i-re :·'rites in his 
introduction to A Lume ~~nent~o (1908): 
',.Jhen the soul is exhausted in fire, then 
doth the spirit return unto its primal nat-
ure .••• Mr. Yeats has treated of such, and I 
because in such a mood; f eelinr· myself d 1 v-
idcd bet··.-·een myself corporeal and a self 
aetherial, ... eternal because simple in elc-
ments .•.• Being freed of the weight of the 
soul· 'capable of salvation or damnation, • 
a grievous, striving thing that after mu~h 
strainin~ ~as taken from me; as had one 
passed sayinE as one in the Book of the 
read, 'I, lo I, am the assembler of souls,' 
and hacJ taken it 1·r 1 th him, 1 eavint. me thus 
sinnlex naturae, even so at peace fnd trans-
sentient as a ~cod-pool I made it.~? 
Pound is describing in other-worldly terms that very stale 
of Enoch~ in which the EFO disenfa[e2 itself from its 
"nRively interested" form. In such a manner the transcen-
dental Fro ('r.'hose "sole remaininc; interest [is] to see and 
d c:=;c ri be [o>.d equat ~ly Yhat he see~:;") mr-1y disc ern the es s.:::nt i:::tl 
fentures of an experience. Hup:h !\ermcr Yrites of ~··hat: he 
cal1s round • ::; '' inta[:lio method:" 
Pound's impersonality is Flaubertian: an 
eff~cement-of the personal accidents of the 
perceiving medium in the interests of accur-
ate rer;lstration' of moeurs contemporaine;,. 
As ···e have said, the adopt ion of various p~?-r­
sonae is for such an artist merely a meRns to 
ultimate depersono.lizati0n, nnfillnry and not 
('Ub::;tant ial to his rna jor ·--ork. ~-~ 
In comparin[_ round's technique to that of other poets, 
concern for revlt:;_lizinr: history •.:;ith his concc·:~n for :ro:r-
trayin~-~ dramatic ecstasy; ..• in othcl~ ~·:ords, they stand some..,. 
~-··here bet·- een 3rm··ninr • s <lramat ic monolocues and Yeats' masks." 
rut siDply, 3ro;,mins represents t.hgt type 0f poetr,y •·.·hich· 
s'ee1~s to ests.blisl1 the essence of a. spec.ific fif.Ul"e as de·-
fined ··ithin the framework of a specific place and time. 
Yeats, on the other hand, lifts hi~ personn above local ref-
erenc~ in order to elucidate its universal nature. Pound 
~evelors a nethod ~hich utilize~ both techniques. In n. 
letter to :>Jilliam C::1rlos 'v!illia:nE in 1908 he \·'rites: "I 
catch the chnracter I happen to be interested in at the 
moment he interests ne, usually a momerit sf sons, self-
an:J.lysiG, or Sll.dden understanding or reveL;.tlon ••.• .. 50 
Bro•·minr~ • s dramat 1 c monolocw es (for ,_:-h 1 eh Found ex-
pressP~ rrent admiration) depend upon a particular rela-
tionship bct~een the poet and his object. In hls Ess':lv on 
Shelley (1852) Drowninc explains by drat inc a dl~tinctlon 
' bet'·een the ''subjective poet" ond the "ob,jective poet." 
The subjective poet, he says, presents primarily hi~ o~n 
vision of thin[s - that is, the outside ~·orld only insofar 
n.r; 'it ":'(=:lnt:e~; to hl::: o-;·:n vision. The objective poet. on· 
it ha;, been dif~torbcd, a::· it · ... ere. throuch a pa-rtieulur vis-
ion. It ls this kind of poet ···hich produces the rJrC'.Glo.tlc 
mnnolocuc. ric eff:"l.ces hlmself ln favor of his object ':lnd 
the re.sultn.nt 1-.rork is ".substantive, projected from himself, 
and distinct •.. 'P1e result ... in its pure form, ~;hen c:ven de-
2 crlp1.ion, as sugcestinc; a dc.scriber, lr; d:i.spem~cd ,-ith, 
''1 j s ··-h<J.t ,.,~ call drnmntlc poetry. ".J ··!hen "description, ::1.r. 
surrestinr a describer'' is present in a ~ork, there has been 
a hre::tkdo···n in t:_he suspension of the subjt'!Ctive (".dlsint.er-
,.., .-:-: t; cd" ) r;: .. o '~ L- ._ .... r . • '{'he task of the poet 1~ to [iet at the th.inr:_s 
thcm:~elvc·s and to present them. BroNnine; states: 
..• the objective, in the strictest sense, 
must still retain its original value. For 
it is vith this world, as startin~-point 
and basis alike, that we shall always have 
t.o concern ourselves: the •:·orld is not to 
be learned and thro,_.m as:lde, but reverted 
to and relearned. The spiritual co~pre­
hension may be infinitely subtilized, but 
the rrn-: mo.t e:rial 1 t operat er~ on must re-
main. There may be no end of the poets 
···ho c.ommunicat e to us ~-:hat they r::ee in an 
object vith reference to their own lndiv-
lclual:lty; '··That it ···as before they sa··· it, 
in reference to the ar~re~ate human mind, 
will be as desirable fb kno~ as ever.52 
() b_i ~c +.lve, displays a stronc Irn:::::wr1iart at t 1 tude rcrarcHnr· 
thr? 1..1.lti.1nate rr.fcrenee of conscjou~;nesr~. '·Ihether the ol:~.icct 
lt as accurately as pos~ibl8. In speakin~ of the ~rt of 
,\rn·:nJt :nni0l and •,nv;:~lcantL round ec.h::>es Ero;mlnc in prnis-
lnr- "thn.t expllclt "!"cnde:rinc, he it .of cxi:ernr:tl r.oture, o:r 
of' F!Jnnt.ion. ~heir te~::timony is thn.t of the eye-1·:itncss, 
thel:r :-ympt.o:ns 0.:re f1.rst-hand. ,_5) In trac 1 np: the essential 
fcCJturcs of the i':iven experienc.c t:he poe:t '· 111 prP.sent not 
. , 
only the object: cut his o·dn virtu ~s ···ell, the "self aether-
18.1" \ 1 c -'- 0 -dc::-;crihcc3 ln 1-1 _,ume ,)pent. , ·.·:h tc h h; ren.l 1::-: cd · hen the 
''»rievous, ::>t:rivinr:" soul (in HU.s::"e:rlian terms, the ''lnte:r-
ested'' E,r:o) l.s set a.side. 
YeAts, too, must denl '·:lth the varloui-~ form."' of "inter-
Every noH and then, T·.·hen somcthinc has 
.stirred my imagination, I beFin talkine to 
myself. I speak in my own person and dram-
atize myself, very much as I have seen a 
nad old t··oman do upon the Jublin qun.ys, [1.11d 
sometimes detect myself speaking and movlng 
as if I t•!ere stili younc:. or ,.,all{in[~ pe:rhnpro 
like an old man ~ith fumbljng steps. 
Prom his consciously detached perspective-Yeats is able to 
brinf into relief the part iculc,ri ties of the cho~ en Ero. 
J-Ie 'rites: "If 1-:e cannot imagine ourselves as different 
from 1d1at vJe :::~re and assume th8.t second. ::;elf, F8 cnnnot j m-
pose n dlsc1pl1ne upon ourselves, thou&h ~c may qcccpt one 
from oi:herF. Actlve virtue r1s c1istingul:chr~d from pr:1.sr-lve 
Rcceptan~0 of n current code i.s thcr~fnr~ theatrical, cons-
c -~ o:-msJ y drumo.t ic, the ·Nen.rin::~ of n mctslr. 
of 2rduour~. full life. ,.55 
H 1::: the condttton 
"Active virtue" is the qualit;.t t·;herchy t·he poet ex~:~·cl~es 
his sc1f-re~pon~:;ibil1ty and renc~·s his lnc:-:ipht by arrivll.1€' 
at each certainty (ln this cn~e. nn alter-cr0) foy himself 
n.nd in his own mRnncr. 
>hrourhou.t .Pound's 1·rork •.H~ find example.<:' of both 3ro1·m-
in:··esqUC' and Yentsian influence. 3rm:n1.ne: is cPrl';;-:tinly evi-
dent 1n the early poem entitled "Cino." It is the ln.ment of 
a ~ln~er past hls prlne and, throu~h Pound's skillful hand-
linr of several levels .of speech, the render is transported 
lnto th~~ "Itn11[!.n ::ampagna 1309, the open road'' (as th~ poem 
ls svbtitlec:): 
Once, b·lce, B. yea.r -
Vo;-uely thus 1·:ord they: 
"Cino?" "Oh, eh, Clno Polnesi 
'~'hP sincer is't you mean?" 
"Ah yes, passed once our 1·.:ay, 
A saucy fellov:, but ... 
(Ch they are all one these va~abonds), 
Feste! 'tis his mm soncs? 
Or some other's that he sings? 
L:lut you, J·iy Lord, ho1·J Yith your city?" 
But you "i·iy Lord," Go(l's pity! 
And all I lme1·~ 1··ere out, liy Lor<l, you 
~~ere L;:Jck-land Clno, e'en as I am, 
r_:; ;~i_nistro. 
I have snns •··omen in thrr!c cttles. 
But it is all one. 
I FiJI sins of the sun . 
. .. oh? .•. they mostly had rrey eyes, 
But it is all one, I l·Till sine· of the 5G sun. -
A1thOUi!h th8 dr8'1l::tti.c r10nolor:ue is t;h(~ obvious r~od0.l, on] y 
the subtitle :J.ctually plnces the evr~nt ··:lthin n ::peclfic t1r:1e 
anc1 pl::;.cc. The voice is c:isernbodied :1ncJ t:iweler-r:. ·.'hus· 
}.lound nch1 ever:: his ronl of present lnc: the chnrrtcter .in R 
r-e":rcl.'l.t. :l nn." 
~·irnj18T1y, :in "Vil1anel1e: ~·he Psycholoe:i<:~~1 iiour," 
the poet's tone is cool and 8bstr0~t: 
I had over-prepared the event, 
that much was ominous. 
·.nth midc1le-ar;einr care 
I had laid out just the ri p-ht boo1ts. 
I had Dlm.ost turned d O'·;n the paces. 
Beauty is so rare a thinp-. 
~.:o fe•·r drinJt of my fountain. 
So much barren regret, 
So many hours vasted! 
And nmr I Fetch, [rom the 'ITlndm·:, 
· the rain, the , .. ·anderlng bus~es • 
.. -,·he poer'l is melancholic, almo::;t.. Criental, and the sudden 
30 
reference to the "histor.lcal" poet comes as a jolt back in-
to a Jesn reflective and specifically harsher present: 
Fm·; the third day is here -
no ~ord from either; 
I:o "'::ord from her nor him, 
Only another man's note: 
"rear Pound, I n.-:11 leavinp, Er1gland ... 57 
"Hu:h :·c]yyn Eauberley" i::; a virtunl scqlJence of ID8.n-
euvers in v;hich the poet is e:radually distilled froT:l the 
'·ork. r:'he v~)ry first section-title 1s a r,;,ym'boJjc removnl 
of the poet: "2.P. Ode Pour L'2:lcction dci son ~·r;pu1chre ..... 
After itc:'ml~::i.nc the dcgenerncies of hi;.; culture ond the 
t rc,n.sursr:: of the p::-t~~t n.nd sketch 1 nr:; 8. scri es of c ont e11porary 
portraits, T'ound (in John l~spey'::-: ,..ords) "s1nc:s his m·;n fare-
Hell" in "j:;nvol (1919)". At this point the fif!lll'e of Hurh 
Seh-yn :::auberley appears for the first tirne. 'I'he subr;equent 
poens take us ir.to l·iau berl~y, . into his lnt ernal vl sions, and 
to hire: denth. 'Che \hole >wrk ends ;·11th f·iauberlcy's Finr;le 
poem, "Hedo.llion." Pound hr:ts systemattcr:tlly lifted m·ra;j all 
direct reference to his own circumstance. 
Tue to the intentional chqra6ter of experience, how-
ever, we mu~t ~ecopnize that a subjective reduction neces-
sarily refers to a corresponding reduction of the object. 
In that 1·'C are concerned here 1'lith "expression," the object-
ive reduction becomes _evirlent only as the very lanfuage of 
the ' ort 1 tself. In all of Pound's •·:or1<: 1' e find reference 
to "concreteness" as the immediate mode of experience. From~ 
his ed 1 t-1 nt' of Fenol.losa' s manuseript to t. he "Ax:\ ornata'' 
paf;sace loc8.t inr_r kno:d ed e:e :·- ithin "the c1 omain of experience, " 
Pound affirms the value of the natural object as the qdequate 
synbol. In a letter to Harriet Honroe he says: "L'l.D['U::tGe 
is made out of concrete things. General expressions in non-
r~onc ret r~ terms are a laz i ne1-;r.;; they are tall:, not nrt, nnf 
crcotion. '!'hey are the rr:?action of thlnrT on the ·-riter .• 
. q~ 
n r:'l t a c r <?G. t i v e a c t }2z. the ' · r it cr . " -" 
r_·rr~~Jl:lvJty, then, consists in rer~G.inin.c· true to the 
tcnc1cd object. ;·.~-;. Eliot has ·--rittPn th:::.t "lol1nc1's verse 
h~ nln:.~rs definite and concrete, because he has a1Na;ys 11. 
- (" 0 
definite emotion behind it."-1 ' 'l'his sl:~;1terr.cnt rever~ls an 
und erstnnd inr o.f the corresponc1 enc c bet'··' een the express ion 
ancl the expressed, 1n ·,·:hich, ncce1rr.l1nr to Hus~~erl, •.·'e f:lnd 
not t' ; o t h c E' e s to be 1< e p t s e p 8. r n t e , but one t h c ~~ l s only . " 
Found 1·T it es: 
As to t~entieth-century poetry, .•• it will, 
I think, move against poppy-cock, it will 
be harder_and saner, it ~ill be ~hat Mr. 
:.Icc··lett called 'nearer the bone.' ••. Its 
force '.:·ill lie in its truth, its interpre-
tative power (of course, poetic force al-
ways does rest there); I mean it will not 
try to seem forcible by rhetorical din and 
luxurious riot. We will have fewer paint-
ed adjectives inpedin~ the shock and stroke 
of it. At least for myself, I ~ant it so, 60 
austere, direct, free from emot1onal slither. 
Pound's m·:n ,,,or1c has t.his austerity and directness. His 
poemr; involve an appeal to the reacler's emotions "1··ith the 
charn of direct lmpres:-: ion, flashing throuc;h rep: ions ~--here 
the intellect cnn only r:rope. ,Gl All non-cssent:ials are 
pruned n.;·o.y, T'Wst :notably the ornamental adjective. Pound 
st::d:cr; tln.t "l:he only adJective that ls ,.,orth usinr': ic~ .the 
acl,jective that is essential to the sense of the passae:e. not 
the cl8corat i ve frill ao ject i ve. ,,() 2 Fenollosa had sho'~m that 
adjectives ~ere actually a form of spin-off from the noun · 
(•-;h.1ch, of courr;e, have no counterpE"J.rt in nature. accordinr' 
to Psnollosa). ~hey tended to clutter the expres2lon. 3y 
··:i_~edlnc r~ut cJ.ll non-essential ndj~etives Pound succeeds ln 
ell~inatinp emotionRl 2lither while retaining the 0ri~inal 
conLour of the experience. Here; t.oo, ~·c place him oet,··een 
Ero:··r:lnr:- ~me) Yeats. For exampl(~, the follo~'ring poem d<:'~rnon-
st.ratcs :::cm"lrkably vell what Pound considers "essential to 
th8 sense of the passace." Each adjective performs nn in-
dispenEable function in the presentation. ~he poem is a 
tran;;lation of "The Beautiful Toilet" (by ;·lei Ehenr-, ll.W t3.C.) 
n.nd conslsts of t•:o modes of reference - one being a visual 
'L1'18C:e and the other a succinct statement of c ircumstam·e: 
Blue, blue is the grass about the river 
Ard the willows have overfilled the close garden. 
And ~·lthln, the mistress, in the midmost of her youth, 
~hite, Yhite of face, hesitates, pas~inf the door. 
Slender, she puts forth a slender hand. 
And ~he was a courtesan in the old days, 
A1:d she has married a sot 
<;ho no1·' e:oer-; drunkenly out 63 APd leaves her too mueh alone. 
The second section only serves to confirm the eMotion called 
forth by the imar;e in the first. In this case, each adje6-
ijve (t~V::rc ~re only four) !~tancls out as .9. concrete unit in 
relation to the other. There is nothinc exces~\ve in the 
dPscript.ion. ·-_',!(. :·!lmsatt expl.<.1lns the danf'er of anjecti.vql 
".c-1 i ther": 
••: he renernl d 1.rect l.on of philosophy froril 
Lo~ks to Kont' lea~s to 'the valuation of 
qu~>.lit.tes over thinps. '·lh.en the proper 
nnMes and essences of thlnrs ~ad been de-
prived of any special dirnlty, the thinr8 
thcm?clves caslly became le~s 1mpres~lvo 
than thelr definitions, their pcriphrapes, 
their qualitative connotationG ... • 
found had harsh thin[S to say about de-
s~ription and explicitly differentiated the 
presentatlve method from it; for overmuch 
qualifleation of thinc-s by 'l.djectiV~!S l.E.sf'-
ens the sense of reality 1n the particula:r 
by placing empharoi<> on the vn2·ue reneral 
1c lnd s of secomlaTy qual.i ties. J:o lon['er · 
is it the unique and particular go~n that 
mat t e r s , but on 1 y the k 1 n d t o ':J h i c h it be-
lon::<;:: 'blue go!•,:n. • ~:uch usac~e only p1p:eon-
holcr: tl1e 0bJeet inr,~tc8.d of truly p::::rrtieular-
izlnc.G• . 
A strlklnc example of Pound's ability to transmit an 
er.wt ion ~.:1 t h a minimum of d escri pt ion .is best shown in a 
comparison of t~o translations of the same poem. The poe~ 
is entitled "f·'an Piece, for Her Imperial Lord" and the 
translators are Herbert Giles and Pound. Giles' version 
is first: 
0 fair Fhite silk, fresh from the Neaver's loom, 
C:lcn.r as the froot, bright as the ':!inter's snm·:-
:-iee! Friendship fashions out of. thee a fan, 
Hound as the round moon shines in heaven above, 
At home, abroad, a close companion thou, 
Stirring at every move, the crateful gale. 
And yet I fe~1r, ah me! that autumn chills, 
Cooling the dyins summer's torrid rage, 
~ill see thee laid neglected on the shelf, 
All thoushts of byrone dnys, l:U\e them bye·one. 
Founcl, on the other hand, eliminates almost the entire text: 
0 fan of white sllk, 
.. clear as frost on the ~r:ass-bJ.acle 
You also are laid aside. J5 
i·:hcreas Giles' "emotion" is made kno~·rn throu0h explicit 
stater:Hmt r1nd over-statement ("And yet I fear, R.h me! ••• "), 
. . 
Pound d CTJP-nd s upon one qu 1 et simile "Hi thin an equally qu ir:t 
observation. In his reduction of the event he.has rcmo~ed 
all but the sliGhtest evidence of u subject:lve presence nnd 
concentrated ~Jttention upon the object.. The emotion 1s im-
plicit in the expression. 
A fj.nnl po~;n, "'}'he Jc:·;eJ. Stairs' Grievance," by Bihaln.l, 
~,r:lll illustrate Pound's use of particulars, but, more impor-
tantly, l::ill intl'Othwe the iclea of 1r:terrelntionship: 
'l'he je't·re1le<1 steps are already quite T:rhite ":·:ith de;·, 
It is so late that the deY soaks my [::;auz e stocki.nr:s, 
And I let do~o.rn the crystal curtain 
And ':·:-"'tch the moon throubh the clear autumn. 
l'JCtl'E: Je1·!·e1 stairs, therefore a palace. Grievance, 
therefore there is something to complain about. 
Gauze stockines, therefore a court lady, not a serv-
ant r;lrl who complains. Clear autumn, therefore he 
has no excuse on account of weather. Also, she haP 
come early, for the de~ has not merely whitened the 
r::talr:::, but soaked her stoc'lzing:s. 'Lhe poem is es- (;( 
peci?-lly prized because she utters no direct reproach.)) 
EAch concrete parti~ular in the poem is a di~tinct entity 
and, as such, is clearly seen in its relationship to the 
0thers. Found's concern for hardness, visual clarity anrl 
an exact and diversified terminolo~y stems from his a~·are-
ness that the particular object i~ in fact a body of paten-
tlo.lities '.·:h1ch is capable of o.snuning crent si::-;nificgnce 
~hen set into certain relationships. In his e8say on C~v-
a1canti Pound states: "Unless a term is left meaninc: onr: 
particular thin~, and unless all o.ttempt to unify diff~rent 
th1n~c. however small the difference, is clearly abandoned. 
all mntaphysical thought de~enerates inta a soup. A Eoft 
teTminn]_rJL~Y i.s merely n.n cndles::: se-ries of middles ... A?.· f-ie 
is sp~~:;.t:}nr.:; here of philosophical t crF1:?, but the same holds 
t:r-uc for poet::r;y. If m~tnphor is the fusion of dissimilar 
th:in::;:3, thr.m its impact ··ill ch~pend upon the orizinqJ. dis-
tinrtnesr; of the term::; 'hich it unlfif:-s. }ound calls for 
th~L qu8llty of exprc::;d0!1 
·.-:lwrc the thoucht has lt::i denw.rcntion, the 
substance its virtu, ~her~ stupid Den have 
not reduced ;.:tll 'enerr·y' to unbnu~Jded, un-
~istinguished abstraction. 
?or the modern scientist enerry has no 
borders, it is a shapeless 'mass' of force; 
even his capacity for differentiqting it to 
~l decree never dreaned by the 8ncic11ts has 
not led him to think of it~ shape or even 
its loci. ~he rose that his magnet makes 
in the iron filln~s does not lead him to 
think of the force in botanic terms, or 
wish to visualize g~at force as floral and 
extant (ex stare). ·· · 
To pc~ccive the magnetic force-field as n ro~e is to exper-
lenc~ 1t .as it is given to consc1ouRness. It 1 s alc;o ta 
illustrate Fenollosa's statement that ''primitive metaphors 
•.. nrc por, s i bl e only because the,y follo;·' obj eet 1 V!':' 1 ines of 
re1at:jons in nature herself." Horr· importantly, it is to 
cxpr~ricncc. 
mcnt of particulars. In a 1908 letter t:o ·:illlam ·~e.rlos 
~illiams he described his technique: "1 record symptoms. a~: 
I r:;e8 'em. 1 r1dvise no remedy. I don't cv~n dr~·- the dis-
c:>2.r>c unw.ll:,·. "'c:>mpcratnre 102. pulse 72, tor1ruc contec.~, 
1 ] l t- .. 69 , -,.. c. rr~c ,,,....._ ~~r ' c ..... .__;;,,~,.- .......... o ...• c.c. the basics of hi~ 
poctle method - the clear p:·esf'nt·;d:ion of ~~ir"nificant de-
t·clity. In far~ t, FouYld' s en.rly uss of the t. erm ":lma~·~" 
referred to an orranr·ernent of tYo o;. more units ("The OYIC 
imnrc poer:J i.::: .'1 fnrn of rmper-poGition: t.hnt i" to ~TtY it-
i-:- o1w idea :::ct on tcp of another.") for thi;, renson 
Pound had no need for syr'lb0l [; of f l xed vo.lur:. 1 j te numbers 
in arithmetic (1,2,7). The si~nificancc of his image ~as 
a variable one, .like that of nlp:cbraic si.[.';ns (a, b, :x:). 'lhese 
Jqttcr depen~ upon their relationship to other~ for their 
value. 
'l.'hu::: ~·-'c unc1erstanc3 Pound's cnthusJasn for describinr::-
art in terms of analytical geometry: It is only the dlf-
fcTcnce in :.::ubject matter that separf:lt-.es the bro. In r-Jno.-
lyt ical c;eomet ry one may actually crcat e form by refer:: l:ne: 
points to the axe~ of geometric planes by a series of coer-
ficlents. .For example, ? 2 2 "the equation (x-~=t) · + (y-b) · :::: :r · 
rovern::- the c:i.:rclc. It ls the circle. It is not a partlcu-
lqr circle, lt ls any and all clrcles. It is nothin~ that 
i~· not :-:?. r.ircle. It is the circlo free of space and time 
lj1n1t::::." Found c:oes on to expluin that 0rt, too, has th1r: 
nbllity to create: "Grertt T'!Ork;:- of art contain thl.s ..• .so~t 
of cqnntion. They cause form to r:omc jnto bcinr. "f:.y the 
'imaGe' I mc8n such an cquqtlon; not un equation of mathc-
matic0, not :~omethj_nl' about 2:.• ..Q. and £• hav·inp 00methln(· 
to r:o '11th form, but about~· cJ:i.ff~~. nit.:llt, havlnrr some-
thhw to 6o ,.;j th raooc1. ,7o 
c:au.Gin,· form to coi!le into b"Clnr,. tlv~n. is the imne(1iate 
purpo~:;o of .found • s refi.nement nnd ~~rrn!1(Yement of spec j fie 
terms. It :is l:he product of ".-::tctivc~ ccncP:is," in '·'hlch the 
pont "direct::: a certn.in fluid farce F:l.[IJ.inst eircU!r.st.ancc." 
.onside:' i:.his pasc.ap;e by .Sur:;serl: 
~e no~ understand the great tasks of the 
ceo's ~elf-explication, or his explication 
of hit; consr.iour, life, vrhich arise concer:n-
inr objccitivities po~itcd or positablc in 
that 11fe. '!'he headinr-, true beln,u and 
truth (in all modaliti~s)~ indicat~s, in 
the case of any objects meant or ever mean-
able for me as transcendentaJ. ego, a struc-
1-l.lro.l differentiation amonr~· the lnfTni te 
multiplicities of. nctunl ond---"POr~slble cop,-
1 b=.tt iones that relate to the object in qUP.P-
tion and thus can somehow go together to 
mal~e up the unity of an identifyinG syn-
thesis. Actually cxistln~ object indicates 
3 part icul<Jr system ~·:it h in this mul t iplic j ty, 
the system of evidences relating to the ob-
ject and belonging together in such a man-
ner that th~y ~ombine to make up one (t9£ugh 
perhaps an 1nf1nite) total evidence •••. 
Pou:v~d 's e.'·;arcnesr; of the :roem as "a sy:;t em of evid cnccs 
relntinr~ to the object" led him to experiment 1·:lth all forms 
of poetlc syntheses: Anl~lo-:·;a:con l(enninpr::, haiku, the id0.n-
,-r.s1m. 8usscrl':> statement, ho'··ever, thr.:tt multipLi..citie[~ 
"sorneho~·· 1'0 tor:ether to make up the un1. ty of nn lcl r;nt l fyiYle· 
scribe the process-of metaphorical thouvht, the most imm0d-
lately synthetic of nll. It is only in poetic t~rms that 
unities ~re properly expressed and unrlerstood. In metaphor-
lcnl thou~ht the ~hole is equal to mars than its p~rts. 
I·;etnphor is, after nll. rnetamo:rphosi~~. Pound ,.·rites: "The 
undeniable tradition of rnetnmorphos:i.8 tenches u~' that thin~.;s 
do not rcmnln the same. rthcy becomp other thirws by f:1.··:ift 
7" . II £. .. 
. '1.nc1 Ultal1c~.J.;yzc'tb1 e process. 
The unanalyzable quality of such experience proves to 
be the source of its poetic power. Pound often refers to 
"that sense of rmdden liberation; that sense of freedor11 
frCJm spnce 8.n(1 tine limits; that sense of sudden r:rm·rth, 
,..h:ic.h ,,.e experience in the pre~~ence of thEJ preatest '·:orkr 
of art."?J This brinr:s to mind Foulet'sdescription of the 
tran~cendental experience of the reader. That is, the reader 
1::; able to experience r~uch a sense of llbcration throuch a 
total d ed icat 1 on to the c·:ork. ife part ic ipat es in the pro-
cess of communication by settinr aside all aspeets of him-
self not essential to the appreciation of the art. The 
follmrinr:; poeT'l (':·hich Pound selected as signet poem of all 
collections published after Personae) seems to describe not 
C1 ~lly thif' process but illso Hu:-::se:rl Is method of establlshlnr:r 'l. 
It is entitled. "The 'I':e0." ano tlC'flnf's the 
unique a~hievemcnt of 2zra Pound: 
I stood still and '··as a tree nJnlc1 the wood, 
:'\no,•inr the truth of thinf_~s unseen before; 
Of [8phne and the laurel bouGh 
And thnt r·od-feasU.nr::~ couple old 
That r:rc'·' elm-onk amid the wold. 
'T· as not until the c:ocJs hr-H] been 
~:indly entreated, and been brou(:ht · :i.thin 
Unto the hearth of their heart's homE" 
~h~t they mirht do this ~onder thin~; 
Nathless I have be0n a tree amjd the wood 
I1.Ld many n. n~-: .t~i~1[ unc1er,stood Y' 71 ~ 
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